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Thomas Woodcock
The Face of the Market
Abstract
This thesis reviews the effect on economic openness that can be established by the
presence of strong Global Compact local networks. The work identifies three measures of
openness and four sets of domestic conditions in which the Global Compact operates,
respectively: (1) prevalence of trade, (2) measures of foreign direct investment and foreign
portfolio investment and (3) policy indicators of openness, in respect to democracies with (a)
strong local networks or (b) weak local networks, as well as autocratic regimes with (c) strong or
(d) weak local networks. A comparative study follows, looking at twenty-three years of data
across fifty countries exemplifying the above domains, to determine what impact, if any, the
Global Compact has had on economic trends and policy. By measuring the reciprocal effect that
enhanced corporate responsibility is expected to have on public trust (reflected in economic
policy), the author purports to strengthen an already robust business case for responsible and
sustained membership in the Global Compact by demonstrating its utility in facilitating business
friendly political climates in its host countries.

Introduction
Capitalism has evolved to become a fiercely magnetic force. Through a phenomenon
loosely referred to as globalization, "a process of intensification of social and economic relations
across borders" (Palazzo & Scherer, p.234), nations rely on one another's enterprise for
financial wellbeing as never before in history. A relatively new corporate responsibility initiative,
the Global Compact (GC) established in 2000, has grown to become the world's biggest,
comprising over 8000 businesses in 140 countries, and accounting for around $25 trillion in
financial assets. How has the Global Compact affected economic policy in countries with strong
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GC local networks? Of particular interest to this paper are economic policies related to trade
liberalization, as well as levels of trade and investment.
Because policy depends on governance structure, this paper will also pay attention to
the type of government in each of the countries sampled for data, as well as "amount" of
democracy, should the country hold democratic elections. Because businesses adhering to the
ten GC principles on human rights, environment, labor and anti-corruption should have a net
positive impact on the communities in which they operate, it is expected that strong GC
networks operating in highly democratic environments should result in proliferating trade
agreements and other pro-liberalizing trends. Weak GC networks should result in fewer
liberalizing policies, while the inverse should be true of dictatorships. Weak GC networks should
result in mild efforts to protect native markets from external influence, and strong GC networks
should result in sustained efforts to protect markets. The presence of a strong Global Compact
network in a democratic society should positively correlate with trade liberalization in both the
public realm and the private sector.
The for rationale for why this should be so is predicated on Washington Consensus
norms, broadly predicting the increased opportunities for ownership and representation that
democracy affords will encourage people to head to the polls out of financial self-interest. The
will of the people, manifest in voting patterns, should persuade governments to open their
borders to more opportunity. Often this has not been the case. Whether to protect jobs or as a
reaction against foreign multinationals enabling human rights abuse, failing to stand up for labor
rights or fueling corruption, populations in democracies have often voted in the opposite
direction. If the GC is having a positive impact on the three areas mentioned above, this trend
away from liberalization should be mitigated. Conversely, in dictatorships or countries with only
nominal democracy, multinationals or domestic businesses being influenced by a set of
externally originated principles should represent a threat to domestic businesses, many of which
will have influence in government. The foreign precedent set by alien norms of good
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governance can be expected to highlight abuses by local firms and potentially conflict with the
practices of illiberal governments. These relatively unconstrained governments will seek to
minimize a meddlesome foreign influence, in proportion to its presence and activity in the
country.
Context
The decade preceding the 2008 financial crisis saw extraordinary economic
developments riding on the back of freer capital flows and sustained five percent annual trade
growth. Trade crested at a full quarter of global GDP in 2007 as technological improvements
facilitated cheaper shipping and communication became faster and more broadly accessible.
Widespread enthusiasm for trade liberalization had seen the establishment of the World Trade
Organization (WTO) in 1995, which helped to drive the increasing density of global ties over
subsequent years. The implications for world poverty were dramatic. The number of people in
the developing world living on less than $1.25 per day dropped from its share of 30% of the
population in the year 2000 to just above 10% now. The size of the middle class in Latin
America has doubled, while in Asia it has increased by a factor of seven (Economist, September
13 2014, p.29-33). The growth burst came to a dramatic end in 2008, and today the
performance of developing countries looks far more modest than in the years before the crisis.
As one side of the globe grows it makes demands, while the other side rises to meet the
opportunities provided and enrich itself in the process. So too the supply side must contract
when economic mismanagement and an irresponsible financial culture put an end to the fat
years. An infinitely complex and all-too-often unstable equation binds the economic fortunes (or
misfortunes) of seven-plus billion people to one another.
The global trend of opening borders and reducing barriers, coupled with technological
developments and social amalgamation, have presented businesses with both opportunities and
challenges. Environmental risks, terrorism, disease and violent protest, as well as increased
activism from civil society, labor unions and other agitators for change have become a great
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concern to today's capitalists as they move the means of production further south into areas
with questionable rule of law. Institutions traditionally charged with mediating conflict on behalf
of the private sector, like the International Labor Organization or the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development have waning influence in these new regions of production.
Business is being done in the gray areas. The need for trust between stakeholders,
governments and businesses has never been so acute, and in the wake of the 2008 Financial
Crisis, so too for the need for trust between business and investors.
Literature Review
The United Nations Global Compact represents a significant paradigm shift for an
organization that has long been seen as operating in fundamentally different spheres to those
inhabited by the private sector. Whenever the world’s largest international organization and
trans- and multinational corporations found themselves confronting a common issue, the
relationship usually gravitated toward a notoriously adversarial status quo, which found little
ground for cooperation. Since then-Secretary-General Kofi Annan launched the Global Compact
(GC) in 2000, speculation has abounded about the means by which the initiative might bridge
the yawning ideological divide between the two international forces. The GC is an attempt at
facilitating a mutually beneficial collaborative process, to a modest extent reigning in the
freedom enjoyed by the private sector by promoting aspirational values and reporting measures.
The real impact of the GC is a subtle normative force, a force that some authors on the subject
hope can change the very culture of international business.
The initiative is still young, barely in its teens. Correspondingly, most of the literature on
the subject remains speculative, or else of the “first decade in review” order. There still exists a
lot of space for what the GC will evolve into and where the collaboration might go, but, actual
measures of impact are scant. A central theme has been to judge how to frame the Global
Compact- through what prism might policy makers and businesses usefully view the subject?
The literature has prescribed five such prisms: 1) as rapprochement between the United Nations
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and the private sector, 2) as the new wave of corporate responsibility, 3) humanized
globalization, 4) facilitating inclusivity and 5) a means for building trust between stakeholders,
institutions and society. Two key areas of criticism also exist, and certainly not independent of
the above perspectives on the GC. There have been concerns voiced that the Global Compact
will function as a species of Trojan horse, allowing the private sector to influence UN activity and
essentially “corporatizing” a humanitarian organization. There has yet to be provided any real
basis for such a fear, therefore it has not been included in the criticisms. First, the relative lack
of interest shown in the United States toward the GC has yielded far fewer signatories than
hoped for (this pertains strongly to the fifth prism, that of trust). This weakens both the scope
and credibility of the GC. Second, there are concerns over the accountability measures imposed
on corporations by the initiative. Are they weak enough that the goodwill of the United Nations
can simply be exploited for a time, to result only in a slap on the wrist? Can the institutional rod
prove effective in dis-incentivizing the more abhorrent behavior observed in multinationals?
The view of the GC as UN rapprochement with the corporate world is more elaborate
than its face value suggests. At its foundation is the story of Annan’s progressive vision, to coopt rather than combat, and the contentious new frontier of global governance that this has
opened. Most UN advocates writing about the GC can’t resist gushing for at least a few
paragraphs of historical context, pleased by the magnanimity shown and genuinely excited by
the new possibilities presented. Beyond this is a more interesting story, one of finding common
ground, and of fortuitous timing. As great segments of the global economy become dematerialized, the flow of information grows ever faster and more accessible, and globalization
thickens, giddy speculation over the creative destruction to be wrought generates ideas like that
of a coming sustainable enterprise economy (SEE). Not only academics, but governments,
businesses and NGOs have taken particular interest in SEE and discourses like it. McIntosh
and Waddock document dozens of roundtable discussions involving GC stakeholders on every
level, taking place all over the world, and the shared sense from public and private alike that an
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edge can be gained by collaboration, to the advantage of both. Sustainable enterprise and
development has been the province of the UN and governments, and together they have much
to share to the mutual benefit of all involved. The private sector is taking the reigns in other
areas once in the near-exclusive charge of government, increasingly taking a hand in education
and HIV prevention, as well as other public health domains. Symbiosis is necessary for the
effective transition and sharing of responsibility. These are case specific examples meant to
demonstrate a pervasive thread, the cadence of business and the international community
finding a need for one another’s knowledge and best practices, the need for a forum, a learning
tool, and the shared need for enhanced legitimacy, through shared goals and aspirations
(McIntosh & Waddock, 2010).
Addressing the issue of legitimacy, John Ruggie, instrumental in the creation of the GC, took
on the challenge of fitting human rights onto the agenda of private business. According to
Leisinger, Cramer and Natour, multinationals are highly sensitive to any perception of their
breaching human rights, but since the concept itself was created with nation states in mind,
relevance to business and a corresponding protocol were not easy to grasp. Leisinger et al’s
article therefore describes Ruggie’s efforts as adapting the code of conduct from the nation
state format to business, disposing of the grey area and replacing anomie with a procedural tool
for private industry. The benchmark phrase in his work became “a duty to respect human
rights”, and the guidelines behind it are becoming the status quo for ethical behavior in
multinationals. The idea of a “regulatory framework” suggests an earlier period of UN
encroachment on private activity rather than rapprochement. Such language might be imagined
to ruffle private feathers, but it was at the request of industry leaders that the guidelines were
drawn up, having recognized that a code would be necessary for them to profit from the GC
(Leisinger et al., 2010).
Other bodies of work frame the GC as an essential part of the new wave of corporate
responsibility. Since the 2008 financial crisis, business has heard demands for sustainable,
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responsible activity grow louder than before, as a global audience settles uneasily on the
realization that periodic financial shocks are becoming the new normal. In their broad analysis of
the GC, Rasche and Kell present the subject through this prism by focusing on “globalizing
corporate responsibility”. The rise of new economic giants in countries like China and India have
increased possibilities for transcontinental business collaboration, as well as economic
interdependence, and through this process certain global governance gaps have been revealed.
It is these fissures that the GC was designed to address. Rather than attempt to leverage public
skepticism in business, the GC addresses corporate responsibility by providing an organic
framework through which to mitigate risk, to learn, and to help position and organize for the
future. For multinationals to meet growing expectations from their customers to reduce carbon
emissions and other environmental detractors, guidance and best practices, as well as
aspirational principles, are provided by the GC (Rasche & Kell, 2013).
Synergy between good governance norms and financial markets, investors in particular,
as facilitated by the Principles of Responsible Investment (PRI), is another area of globalized
corporate responsibility. In his article evaluating the PRI, James Gifford focuses on the
incentives that have led 700 investors (representing $25 trillion in assets) to sign on to the PRI.
The Universal Owner hypothesis, at the center of his explanation, is a prime example of the
process of globalized corporate responsibility, demonstrating the negative impact of
irresponsible corporate behavior on highly diversified investors. Since investors own a piece of
the economy, any negative externalities imposed upon it by irresponsible behavior will only
serve to harm their own interests. Investors have thus come to see the GC and PRI as means to
shore up their investments and regularize returns (Gifford, 2010).
Humanizing globalization presents at once the specter of a chirpily optimistic buzz
phrase and the possibility of being just vague enough to act as a malleable rubric beneath which
to marry a range of isolated concepts. One year before the launch of the GC, Secretary-General
Annan proposed a joint effort between the UN and private business to “give a human face to the

7

global market”. The idea of re-anthropomorphizing economic forces seems to form part of the
very spirit of the GC, making it a viable prism through which to consider the initiative. All ten
aspirational principles encouraged by the GC on its signatories are of a “Washington
Consensus nature”, promoting respect for human rights, labor standards, the environment and
anti-corruption. Guy Ryder writes on the GC’s efforts to promote labor standards from just such
a perspective, arguing that stakeholder integration is necessary to further labor principles.
Other literature (McIntosh & Waddock, 2010, Leisinger, Cramer & Natour, 2013, Kell
2013) points to the GC less as a tool for implementing a humanitarian agenda and more as a
zeitgeist, harmonizing with the phenomena of 24/7 connectedness, collapsed distances and
diminishing boundaries. For these authors, the GC humanizes the market by applying human
experience to it, creating the opportunity to learn in a humanized context and facing down some
of the exigent circumstances we face as a planet. This approach to the GC implies the need for
a collective spirit of mutual responsibility and a shared sense of threat and obligation to
respond. Environmental areas, because of the existential threat found therein, present some of
the most fertile ground for exposition of a humanizing role for the GC, in tandem with
sustainable development. Authors have found, unsurprisingly, that this impression of the
initiative is found more abundantly in the developing world than the developed (McIntosh &
Waddock, 2010).
Still other writers have found it appealing to focus on the inclusive nature of the GC.
After all, no sense of rapprochement, increased responsibility, anthropomorphization or trust
could be deemed realistic without a strong spirit of inclusivity. From this standpoint, the GC is a
breathing, adapting, learning tool, “A living, active process for continuous, practical
improvement” (Kell, 2013) according to Bo Miller (as cited by Georg Kell), Global Director of
Corporate Citizenship at Dow Chemical. These authors tend to focus on the proliferation of local
GC networks within the international networks, as well as on the establishment of fora for multistakeholder discourse- a particular trademark of the United Nations. Also within this framework
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there has been focus on the Principles for Responsible Management Education (PRME), an
initiative within the GC to disseminate the lessons learned as well as their values to business
school leaders, establishing a clear foundation for the adoption of GC principles early in the
lives of tomorrow’s business and investor generations. Within the above-described PRI, a
particularly successful forum has sprung up to address environmental, social and governance
(ESG) concerns. The Clearinghouse, as it is known, has been highly effective at bringing
investors together to apply pressure to other investors to improve ESG performance, share best
practices and agree on policy (investment) positions on certain issues. Overall, one of the great
strengths of the inclusivity of the GC, according to the literature, has been the amplified
involvement of small and medium sized enterprise around the discussion table. This has had
the effect of infusing new blood into debate circles, of airing out cloistered corporate discourse
and abating the risks of groupthink that abound at the higher levels of skyscrapers in New York
and Shanghai (Gifford, 2010).
The prism of trust is the most open to criticism, as the GC has no mandated code of
conduct, nor regulatory teeth. Authors point out that the ten principles are an aspirational guide,
and the reporting mechanisms in place threaten signatories only with de-listment in the event of
non-compliance. Gilbert and Benham point out that it is the trust placed in the GC by
stakeholders that mitigates risk by reducing uncertainty and therefore proving advantageous to
participants. Trust is the key to ensuring that the system actually works to the benefit of those
involved. It is foundational to the relationships among signatories as well as between the UN
and private business. Literature on the subject so far has been mostly policy prescriptive and
focuses on means to increase trust and accountability among participants and across strata
(Gilbert & Benham, 2013).
The bulk of the writing on the Global Compact has therefore focused on definition and
means to realize potential. Certainly a lot of buzz has been generated by the observed reaction
to the GC across government, business and civil society at large. Certain measurements of
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impact have been made, largely in assessing the incentives for private business to join up- an
essential area of study if the GC is to be deemed efficacious. It seems there are positive
financial returns associated with being an active signatory, and notwithstanding critics
condemning the GC for a lack of accountability, there are negative financial returns associated
with de-listment. Some impact-based data has also been analyzed pertaining to the success of
the GC in improving worker conditions and emphasizing the environment, although any impact
here is difficult to attribute directly to the Compact because of the near impossibility of isolating
the cause. Alas, in the ever-thickening world of international political economy, isolating the
impact of the GC so as to point and say “this causes that” is unlikely at best. Some soft data
suggests that signing up to the Global Compact does indeed encourage businesses to act in
more responsible ways, however, due to the proportional dearth of companies signed up, it is
entirely possible that many of these companies would have behaved so regardless. An equally
convincing narrative would be “Responsible companies sign up to the GC” instead of
“Companies sign up to the GC then become increasingly responsible”. There still exists no hard
data on the effects of the GC on government trust. Many authors reference a need for
governments to get involved, and increased market openness being a sought-after outcome for
stakeholders, but as yet no convincing study to suggest that this has been, or is likely to be, the
case. Two of the strongest participants, India and China, have been increasingly open to foreign
investment. Just last month India opened up one of its largest energy firms to international
investors for the first time, while at the same time India stymies landmark WTO agreements.
What impact is the Global Compact having on economic policy in the developing countries that
seem to have the most use for it? Can there be a discernible shift in the culture of policymaking
in these countries brought about by increased trust, inclusivity and perceived corporate
responsibility?
In order to test the hypothesis that strong Global Compact networks will have an
“opening” effect on economic policy and business culture in democracies, this paper will turn to
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a quantitative analysis of representative countries, described in detail below, in the Methodology
section. Due to the high volume of data involved in doing so, the discussion will make extensive
use of graphic analysis to demonstrate observable trends. Following from a description of the
results will be an analysis of their implications in proving, or disproving, the hypothesis.

Objectives of the Thesis
As stated earlier, when addressing the World Economic Forum in 1999, then-Secretary
General Kofi Annan proposed what would become the Global Compact as a way to “put a
human face on the global market.” As much of the current literature makes note, concerns about
certain exploitative or irresponsible practices of foreign multinational corporations had fostered
an apparently adversarial relationship between the private sector and the United Nations. The
central disputant on behalf of the UN was the General Assembly (GA), which made extensive
use of its considerable public relations capabilities to broadcast disapproval of a corporate
culture that was perceived to be inhuman in the utmost degree. The GA’s capacity to make,
influence or enforce legislation proved incommensurate to the force of its messaging, thus the
situation became one of verbal hostility without matching political muster. Ensuing frustration
with the limitations of the bully pulpit was met in the private sector with an enduring suspicion of
the UN. Annan’s speech marked a moment of potential for reconciliation between the global
public and the private. It was a top priority from day one, and remains as such to this day, to be
able to attract business to the table, to convince businesses that filing an annual
Communication on Progress (COP) will be in their interest, alongside sustained and active
participation in addressing economic, social and governance (ESG) issues. A cynical view of
doing business in the modern world has led some to question whether the more cost effective
way to achieve the bottom line of market profitability wouldn’t be to exploit poor labor conditions
or a lack of environmental regulations in a host country.
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The business case for joining the Global Compact has been made by academics, and
made again (perhaps more conclusively) by the more-than 8000 businesses that have signed
onto its growing roster. However, the attrition rate, businesses delisted because of a failure to
comply with the COP requirement, stands at around 30%, still alarmingly high. Business today
is more mobile than ever before. For every opportunity offered by an emerging labor market in
which to relocate factors of production and other assets, a challenge tends to rear its head, from
violent activism to degraded water supplies or unstable governments. Stability is central to
prosperity, be it for an individual company, a nation, or the international system. The business
case for the Global Compact, as currently understood, hinges on its capacity to stabilize and
ameliorate conditions “on the ground”, while showing investors and the public that social
responsibility is taken seriously by the company leadership. It also hinges on communication.
Through various fora (such as the PRI Clearing House and established linkages within local
networks and between global ones), the foundation of the “human face to the market” is to be
found in the dialogue GC membership facilitates. This very dialogue sets the bar for responsible
and efficient corporate responsibility, providing tools and best practices for addressing problems
while participation in the discussion helps polish the public image of businesses involved. After
only fifteen years it may be too soon to establish whether a significant effect on public opinion
can be determined by the presence of a strong local GC network, or else the effect may be too
weak or diluted to measure. Nonetheless it is the aim of this thesis to further the business case
for GC membership by inquiring into the possibility of such a trend.
This hypothesis is based on the premise that adherence to the ten principles should
produce more amenable public opinion visa vis business in countries with strong local networks.
It follows that a weaker network would produce a less significant effect. Public opinion is
particularly relevant in democracies because it serves as permission for governments to more
aggressively address, or adopt a more laissez-faire attitude toward, a particular issue. If the GC
builds trust among stakeholders, by the same mechanism a more accountable private sector
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should be able to build trust with the public. That trust can be readily translated into political
capital reserved for opening up to trade and investment. In cases of governments that have
build a relationship with their constituents based on staunchly socialist or business-wary
principles, any improvement in public perception of business may be eschewed from the top
down. Governments may also choose to trade more and accept greater amounts of investment
without announcing publicly that much, or any, “opening up” is occurring.
A significant negative effect can also be expected from the 2008 financial crisis, which,
regardless of the GC’s best efforts at pluralism, heinously damaged perceptions of global
finance. Both foreign direct and foreign portfolio investment saw enormous global drops in
confidence through their association with the firms and practices that wrought havoc on the
global economy. Businesses also suffered, and through the difficult times faced as a result of
the downturn and increasing unemployment in many parts of the world public trust in their
benevolence may have been negatively impacted. Certain industries, particularly in the global
south, operate in a countercyclical fashion to the trends of the developed economies. In these
cases the businesses involved should be shielded from the effects described above. It would be
unreasonable to expect market forces not to play a significant role in affecting the outcomes that
could ideally be attributed to the GC alone, but as an innovative part of a complex system of
approaches that increasingly seek to “fly below the radar” of conventional politics, a sustained
and growing effect on opinion can reasonably be expected. As with all grassroots movements,
the effect should be an inductive force of influence that ultimately comes to affect policy.
Other factors sullying the clear waters needed for a conclusive diagnosis include a
traditionally pro-business/pro-investment orientation, a traditional reliance on primary commodity
exports, the need for a capital injection stemming from infrastructure needs, post conflict
settings and the myriad other reasons governments may need fast cash, as well as autocratic
regimes. Of the above, only one (autocratic regimes) is within the purview of this thesis to
address and control for. Political science is not conducive to the elegant, black and white
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research designs of the hard sciences or even psychology. While a few elements, or a handful
of people can readily enough be pulled into a laboratory and ostracized from many of the
conditions that would usually affect them, the same cannot be done for Liberia or India. The
political economies examined by this thesis are for the most part modern or modernizing (for the
most part depending on more than just resource extraction), and consequently they are each
awesomely complex, subject to both internal and external environments that are constantly in
flux. A direct, observable and conclusive causal relationship between variable A, the presence
of a strong GC local network, and variable B, increased economic openness, cannot reasonably
be expected in these conditions. The most that may be sensibly asserted from the work will be a
trend toward openness, which the GC serves to support. The fact of a complicated world
notwithstanding, it is still an important piece of the puzzle. On an intuitive note, it stands to
reason that as one side of a relationship changes, that of business toward society, the other will
also gradually begin to realign and adapt to a changing partner. It’s difficult to think of many
examples in society where this is not seen to be the case.
What can be inferred from strong local networks resulting in increasingly open
economies should be of particular interest to businesses, investors, the United Nations,
politicians and civil society. If globalized corporate responsibility has prompted greater
accountability, reinforced trust and soothed the relationship between business and the
communities in which they operate then a powerful policy tool has been discovered for reversing
the lackluster economic fortunes of some regions. Business and investment will have found a
legitimate platform through which to interface in a positive context with their environment, with
the enormous added benefit of having to contend with more amenable policies. Businesses will
be offered a convincing argument that, by being part of a responsible GC membership, they are
creating the foundations of their own 21st century grassroots movement, an advocacy network
capable of achieving the ends they desire in harmony with their host environment. Such
approaches have been traditionally been used against their interests and in response to a
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perceived lack of social responsibility. Many businesses will know, from experience, the efficacy
of those tactics. With the strategic orientation of the UN shifting toward the inclusion of
development in more and more aspects of its work, the findings of this thesis should be of
interest to a significant share of the international organization. With the Global Focal Point
(GFP) emphasizing development in the practice of peacekeeping, and the necessity of muscular
development to organs such as UN Habitat, this subject should be of broad interest. Most
significantly of all, it provides the GC itself with a more robust business case, and should serve
to persuade members future and present that de-listment is very much against their interests.
In practice, establishing the kind of causality required by the hypothesis turned out to be
unrealistic. One the one hand, there are simply too many moving parts to an economy to point
to one initiative and cite it as the cause of a particular policy direction or business climate. What
does prove possible, however, has been to establish what kind of environments host, and
therefore have use for, the Global Compact, and which do not. They tend to correlate fairly
strongly with investor preferences, as predicted by James Gifford’s literature on the Principles of
Responsible Investment. Highly extraverted business cultures (those that depend to a large
degree on trade), however, tend not to favor hosting strong GC networks. The hypothesis must
therefore be altered to reflect the differing modes of operation between businesses and
investors. While investors favor environments that embrace ESG norms and corporate
responsibility, highly extraverted business environments seek advantage by avoiding such
innovations.
Methodology
In order to demonstrate that a relationship exists between trade liberalization and levels
of GC activity, a contrast will be drawn between countries with strong GC networks versus weak
ones, as well as democracies versus autocratic states. Sample data will be taken from fifty
countries, randomly selected from the pool of countries with data available and matching the
criteria for four categories: democracies with strong local networks, democracies with weak local
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networks, autocracies with strong local networks, and autocracies with weak local networks.
The data, available from World Bank and the World Trade Organization, compiled to gauge
openness of economic policy, will be levels of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), levels of Foreign
Portfolio Investment (FPI), and openness to trade, calculated as revenue from trade divided by
GDP, as well as policy indicators of openness (average applied tariffs and ease of starting a
foreign business). For each of the fifty countries a control sample will be taken, comprising the
data between 1990 and 2000, before the GC came into being. The data of particular interest for
this essay will be the twenty-five participating countries' openness between 2000 and 2013. The
data will be graphically presented in addition to six results tables.
Before developing a model to assess economic openness, specific economies needed
to be chosen as exemplars of the four conceptual domains under consideration: democracies
with strong Global Compact networks, democracies with weak Global Compact networks,
autocracies with strong Global Compact networks and autocracies with weak Global Compact
networks. The GC provides a map of its presence across the world on its website, categorizing
countries as possessing “formal”, “established”, “emerging” or nonexistent networks. For the
purposes of comparison, only “formal”, the strongest category, was admitted to the
corresponding “strong network” designation. “Weak networks” are defined as nonexistent or
“emerging”.
The designation of a country as “democratic” or “autocratic” relied on the Economist
Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index 2010. This report creates four broad designations as well
as an individual ranking for the political environment of a given country. The four designations
are as follows: “Full Democracies”, “Flawed Democracies”, “Hybrid Regimes” and “Authoritarian
Regimes”. The ideal situation for research would have been to keep the associations “pure”,
with both autocratic categories of this research limited to “authoritarian regimes” and vice versa
for democracies and “full democracies”. However, preference was given to a broader and more
geographically representative dataset, and certain flawed democracies were admitted into both
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democratic categories (e.g. democracies with strong and democracies with weak networks). To
balance the equation, an equal number of hybrid regimes were categorized as autocracies. A
full country list is provided below.
In the selection of countries, an attempt was made to keep each sample group broadly
geographically representative, however realities on the ground kept this from being possible to
the extent desired by pure theoretical intentions. It is simple fact that an autocracy with a weak
GC network is impossible to find in Europe, or that there is a dearth of democracies with strong
GC networks in Africa, and none to speak of in the Middle East. With this being said, random
selection was limited as far as necessary by concerns of continental representation, so as to
have Latin America or Europe represented by a fixed number of countries in order not to under
or overplay their influence in a set category. The selection of the countries within a continent
was random, as far as possible, and determined by a dice roll. However, the continents
themselves were automatically chosen and allotted a certain number of national
representatives. Where possible, higher populations (such as Asia) were given weighted
representation, reflected by more countries from that continent being present in the group. This
was only an issue for the “democracies with strong networks” category, which boasts
representatives from Europe, Asia, Africa and the Americas. The second broad category to
define was “autocracies with weak networks”, though here the choice was much more limited to
Central Asia, Africa and the Middle East. All three regions are represented, and once again their
specific national representation was selected at random.
The third and fourth categories are much tighter, and represent almost exhaustive
samples. Both autocracies with strong GC networks and democracies with weak GC networks
are fairly aberrant on the world stage. The results go some way toward explaining why this subset has chosen to adopt or shun the GC. Despite their small numbers, the issues that make
these two sets uniquely problematic are very different. They are very distinctive and bear little in
common beyond their relative paucity. “Autocracies with strong networks” are limited to Asia
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and Africa (with one exception), but include two of the world’s biggest economies: Russia and
China. Investment is subject to the gravitational pull of giant economies, so some graphs are
controlled for the two nations to demonstrate the magnitude of their effect on a set of otherwise
small to medium economies. Meanwhile, “democracies with weak networks” are heavily skewed
towards European nations. Exactly one half of this dataset has acceded to the EU, which
presents its own issues for the research. The common market exerts a strong influence, through
its vast incentives for trade and standardization requirements, on the openness of a countries’
economic policy. Much of the data provided by World Bank or the World Trade Organization
treats the EU as one economy and therefore doesn’t go into detail on specific countries. The
related literature has correspondingly focused on trade within the EU and between the EU and
other regions, with very little said nowadays about bilateral trade relations between, for instance,
the Slovak Republic and Russia (OECD Slovak Republic, p. 10).. In fact, the Slovak Republic
relies to a considerable degree on Russia for energy imports. It stands as the Slovak Republic’s
second largest individual trading partner after Germany. This information often requires paring
away from the dominant Union-driven narrative.
There are many models of economic openness, and over the years these have become
increasingly sophisticated in terms of structure. Indicators like public availability of high tech
communications, cultural factors influencing investment or multiplicities of non-tariff barriers to
trade have been integrated and have served to deepen the content of resulting data, while
apparently offering nothing toward the creation of any kind of scientific consensus on “the best
model” (Lane, 2007). For research such as this, with a broad sample base and without a team
of researchers able to work around the clock to harvest recondite data, a more traditional model
for assessing the openness of the economies under consideration has been devised. It does,
however, go to some lengths to create as detailed a picture as possible of the economies in
which the GC operates (as well as those in which it doesn’t operate). The model is three
dimensional, examining levels of trade, protectionist policies and investment.

18

Levels of trade comprise the most detailed category, examining trends over a twentythree year period beginning in 1990. For each of the fifty countries, trade data was collected as
the percentage of GDP accounted for by 1) trade in services, 2) trade in merchandise, 3)
imports of goods and services and 4) exports of goods and services. The four in combination,
while not drawing an intricate sketch of every highly diversified economy under consideration,
still gives a strong indication of the quality and character of the respective cultures of trade, how
important trade is to an economy, and how advanced that economy is (service oriented
economies generally being considered more modern). The mean average numbers for trade as
percentage of GDP were taken for each category, each successive year from 1990 to 2013.
Therefore, the percentage of GDP accounted for by merchandise trade in 2002 among
democracies with strong global compact networks is presented as a single number (43.18%,
incidentally)- that number is the category average for the year. In this way, a trend is established
among the grouping, which becomes significant when graphed in relation to the other three
groups. The period 1990 to 2000 is relevant as the decade before the GC came into being, and
therefore as a sort of control period. Though it barely needs expressing, many other things
happened in the early 2000s that can account for changes in the makeup of globalization. Also,
most of the countries involved in this research signed up around 2004 (the modal average year),
with some before and some after. This may serve to complicate the results, however, it is the
contention of this work that considerable substance can be inferred from the findings, and
justifiably used to address the research question.
The second temporal measure of trend is in investment. Once again, an average is
taken from 1990 to 2013 across fifty countries divided into their four categories. The two
measures for investment are foreign direct investment (FDI) in US dollars and foreign portfolio
investment (FPI) in US dollars. Here the sizes of the sums become problematic because, as
previously mentioned, larger economies tend to attract larger amount of investment. The
discipline in interpreting the results is to look carefully at the shape and degree of the graphic
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lines, rather than their height. The starting point in the year 2000 in relation to their end point in
2013 is more important for the research question than strict amounts. The third group of
measures is an indicator of economic policy: average applied tariff (AAT) and ease of starting a
foreign business (determined by time taken to acquire permits, accessibility of necessary
resources etc.). These measures are not taken on a year by year basis, but instead are to be
considered as a static snapshot of where these economies are today in terms of their
liberalization policies.
Data for the trade and investment dimensions was collected from World Bank’s website,
which provides statistical research materials for public use up to 2013. The remaining
dimension, economic policy indicators, was collected from the World Trade Organization
(WTO)’s 2014 World Tariff Profiles. One final note should be made about the results collected.
Due to two phenomena, the bifurcated world economy prior to the end of the Soviet Empire, and
the difficulty in collecting data from particularly opaque political contexts, there are occasional
holes in the numbers. Particularly in the case of FPI, some countries have seen very little of this
type of investment officially reported, not surprisingly the problem is acute for data collection
from autocracies. Likewise, some of the eastern European, former Soviet bloc countries, not to
mention Russia itself, didn’t have economic information published prior to about 1993-1994
through World Bank or the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) or WTO. In terms
of the dimensions themselves, almost all the data is robust (with the exceptions described
above) but for one category: trade in services. This was not treated by World Bank as having
necessitated its own focused data prior to 2005, with the upshot for this research being that only
eight years of information were available.
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Analysis of the Data
The data tells two different stories, elucidated and graphically represented below. In
accordance with the bulk of existing literature on the subject of economic liberalization, there are
many robust differences to be observed between the openness of autocracies and
democracies. That autocracies tend to favor a closed or protective approach to economic
stewardship is particularly visible in the policy dimension (average applied tariffs and ease of
starting a foreign business), where tariffs are distinctly higher among the autocratic groups and
the ease of starting a foreign business is distinctly lower. Likewise for the investment dimension,
a preference is shown toward democratic regimes as recipients of foreign capital. Here the
distinction is clearer for the foreign portfolio investment (FPI) data. The challenge to the
investment data comes from the tendency of larger economies, and especially larger economies
with high growth rates, to attract greater sums of capital. It is certainly no revelation to declare
that democracies tend to have larger, more diversified economies, however, two major
aberrances to this trend are included in the “Autocracies with Strong Networks” category
(Russia and China). On the other hand, average size of economy in the “Democracies with
Strong Networks” category far outstrips its opposite, “Autocracies with Weak Networks”.
Therefore, in interpreting the graphic data, it is important to adopt an analytical lens that
privileges trends as well as degrees. Where necessary or instructive, the data was controlled for
larger economies and new graphs were generated.
Equally important to bear in mind on the trade dimension is precisely what the “% of
GDP” measure is indicating. More than a measure of how competitive or successful a nation's
trade infrastructure is, the data tells how dependent on imports or exports of various kinds an
economy is. Thus, the United States may be less dependent on external trade than Cote
d’Ivoire, while remaining far less sensitive to the rise and fall of certain commodities and
exporting a far more diverse range of goods and services. An attempt to capture some of this
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more complex appraisal was made by including the categories “Trade in Manufacturing as % of
GDP” and “Trade in Services as % of GDP”.
Investment
i) FDI
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A few economic trends, clearly illustrated by the FDI data, will persist as common
themes across most, if not all, of the data. For the most part, the story of increasing or
decreasing influxes of wealth is a shared one, with global forces governing a “master trend” until
the recovery from the 2008 financial crisis. This correspondent tendency across the data is most
clearly seen in two separate episodes: first, the steady increase of investment activity since
1990, and second, the universal decrease (albeit temporary) in capital inflows in 2008. From
here, the stories of the respective groups diverge. Autocracies with weak local networks see a
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sharp increase in investment after the crisis, a trend that was established throughout the 2000s
but gains even more momentum post-2008. Democracies with strong local networks also see
robust investment returning after the crisis. By far the least subject to potentially destabilizing
(given the relative sizes of their economies) inflows and outflows of cash are autocracies with
weak local networks, represented by a far smoother gradient indicating a cooler investment
climate toward the group. While democracies with weak local networks fare hardly any better
than their autocratic counterparts in terms of sums, the erratic nature of their capital flows
suggest greater openness.
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As previously noted, investment tends to gravitate toward larger economies. To
compensate for one of the weaknesses of the “autocracies with strong networks” group, the
following graph depicts the two FDI front-runners, autocracies and democracies with strong
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networks, and controls for the two largest economies, Russia and China. The results are
dramatically different, showing a clear preference on the part of investors for the democracies
with strong local networks group. However, regardless of whether democratic institutions create
more investment prone environments, the FDI data supports the notion asserted by Global
Compact officials: that strong GC presence does increase investor confidence.
ii) FPI
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Foreign portfolio investment implies a willingness on the part of investors to make longterm capital commitments. It can reasonably be expected that a national investment climate will
be thoroughly scrutinized before any money changes hands, and that investors will be ultrasensitive to risks in making a determination on whether or not capital will be well placed for the
longue duree. Accordingly, autocracies with weak local networks see very little of this type of
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activity. Autocratic regimes are by and large notorious for a contemptuous, or at the very least
fickle, attitude towards individual property rights. An investor would be wary of his or her hardwon capital being potentially expropriated by a cash strapped dictator. The presence of Global
Compact networks, however, seems to make a considerable difference in this evaluation. While
the enthusiasm for investing in an autocracy with a strong network (bearing in mind the relative
size of the two BRICS economies included in the group) is roughly a third of that shown for its
democratic counterparts, it is still remarkably higher than the “autocracies-without” group.
The two democratic groups, with their reputation for accountability and rule of law, far
outperform the autocrats in this type of investment. Perhaps contradicting the spirit of a portfolio
investment, capital inflows and outflows appear even more volatile on this measure than they do
for FDI, and democracies with strong networks appear especially susceptible to the shocks.
Their fortunes see a deeper trough than democracies without strong local networks, which
otherwise keep up with the GC membership group in terms of amounts invested. However,
mirroring democracies with strong networks’ apparent capital flight around 2006 and again in
2009 is a muscular recovery since the crisis, to unprecedented levels of FPI approaching
national averages of $20 billion.

Economic Policy Indicators
The most generic measure of economic openness, average applied tariffs (AATs)
comprises the first half of the policy dimension. Rather than observe trends over time, AATs (as
well as the second dimension: ease of starting a foreign business) are taken as a static picture,
a snapshot of where the state is today in terms of its levels of protectionism. Democracies show
themselves to be more open and less prone to protecting their borders than autocracies, both
democratic groups scoring lower (and therefore more welcoming to imports) than autocracies.
However, the differences within democratic/autocratic groups are not what the thesis hypothesis
would predict. In a reversal of the investment data, it is autocracies with strong local networks
that levy the highest tariffs on foreign goods and services, considerably above those with weak
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networks. This is not necessarily problematic for the hypothesis, which predicts any positive
effects of the Global Compact on economic openness to be found only in democracies. It may in
fact lend some support to the idea that the inverse of the hypothesis takes place in autocracies:
those with GC networks may become gradually more cautious of private businesses advocating
a progressive agenda within their borders, and signs of this skepticism could appear in national
economic policy. This could not explain, however, why an autocracy wouldn’t simply prohibit GC
membership within its borders, rather than allow it to affect policy.
The democratic groups pose the greater question. Why would democracies with weak
local networks impose, on average, more than a percentage point lower tariffs than those with
strong networks? Certainly the high representation of European Union (EU) countries affects the
average score, but even when controlled for EU nations the democracies with weak local
networks group have slightly lower AATs. Little is revealed by the second half of the policy
indicator dimension, ease of starting a foreign business, beyond what might be expected
between democracies and autocracies. Considering the wider numerical margins, the
percentage point or so of variation in favor of democracies with strong networks over those with
weak ones doesn’t appear to be as significant as the variation in AATs. Autocracies make life
considerably harder for foreigners looking to set up shop within their borders, but again it is the
autocracies without GC networks that fare worst on the economic indicator dimension, Sudan
scoring the lowest of any country here examined. If a causal argument specific to ease of
starting a foreign business were to be made using Global Compact presence as the
independent variable, it might run along the following lines: autocratic regimes with strong local
networks compensate for the admission of a progressive agenda into their business sector by
limiting foreign influence in domestic enterprise through other channels, namely, by impeding
the establishment of foreign firms.
The relative difference in the ease of starting a foreign business in autocracies with
strong networks vs. weak ones is around 7%, as seen in the Economic Indicators table in the
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appendix. By contrast, the two presumably polar groups, democracies with strong networks and
autocracies with weak networks, see a difference of only around 10%. At such an early stage in
the analysis of results, and in accordance with the earlier findings on the investment dimension,
the most likely explanation for such a considerable variation within the autocratic groups is the
sophistication of those particular economies. If the Global Compact is not treated as a causal
factor, these findings still serve to make sense of the environments in which the Global Compact
operates. The more economically advanced autocracies are either shrewd in their economic
stewardship, and willing to host an initiative that champions principles that many of them have
been critical of (China, for example, is notoriously hostile to labor rights) in exchange for the
benefits that come with reformist credentials, or else they see some shared interests with the
GC. China, despite its antipathy to organized labor, has gone to astonishing lengths under Xi
Jinping’s administration to purge corruption (principle number 10), and made strides toward
enacting sustainable green policies. It does seem clear from the policy data, however, that
these same economies, which tend to be subject to greater governmental regulation, favor a
more autonomous approach to development, and are sensitive to influence from without, in
spite of their strong GC networks.
Trade
While constituting the most conventional (and probably the most intuitive) measure of
economic openness, trade as a percentage of GDP should also be seen as a measure of an
economy’s dependence on trade. A country like the Slovak Republic, with an export led
economy that also depends on vast energy imports from Russia for its output, will be highly
dependent on trade and therefore open by necessity. Trade in the Slovak Republic accounts for
twice their proportional GDP when compared to many developed countries, the United States
included. In many ways these countries are paragons of globalization, and likely more sensitive
to the trappings of interdependence like free trade areas or political conflicts that threaten to
disrupt trade.
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i) Imports, as a % of GDP
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Immediately striking for the import dimension is not only the relative independence of
national GDPs with strong GC presence on imports, but also the similarities in trend and
amount. For both autocracies and democracies with strong GC networks, a steady but
modest rise in imports as a percentage of GDP is seen from 1990 onward, with an increase
of around 5% from 1990 to 2013. Also for both groups a higher level of trade activity
(acceleration in the amounts imported as well as more erratic relationships with trade
partners) can be seen after the year 2000. Without looking to the Global Compact as a
cause, it seems fair to say that the global trading culture the GC was born into and adopted
by was set to become increasingly unpredictable. For the democratic half of the duo, the
spike and brief but precipitous fall after the 2008 crisis was felt more acutely (or more
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accurately, felt acutely by their trading partners), whereas the autocratic contingent were
more insulated. All four groups circa 2012 felt the general downturn in import behavior.
Autocracies with weak networks exhibit considerably higher rates of dependence on
imports, and see increases of around 12% during the same timeframe. Their rate of imports
rose at a higher gradient between 2000 and 2008, but the post-crisis drop is of roughly the
same amount as the other groups, before picking back up in 2010. The headline for this
dataset is democracies with weak networks, initiating a trend for the trade dimension. These
economies were already importing more in the 1990s than the other groups, and
accelerated to a 20-point rise by 2013, far above the levels shown by democracies with
strong networks.
ii) Exports, as a % of GDP
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The first two trade indicators taken in conjunction provide a broad picture of each
groups’ trading relationship with the world. An even match between lines would indicate a
balance, and discrepancies in a given year point to a surplus or deficit for the group. Barring
economic catastrophes (of which there are a few), and given the aggregate nature of the data it
can be expected that the export and import trends roughly mirror one another. States like to
avoid large trade deficits as far as possible, and few are lucky enough to push their wares out
into the world without needing something in return. Indeed, the general trends remain stable,
with increases in exporting being the norm across all four groups. Both democracies and
autocracies with strong GC networks are once again modest in their movement towards
interdependence, with autocracies aping democracies in their export behavior post-2008 far
more closely than with their imports.
Autocracies with weak networks are frequently at a disadvantage, with major problems
briefly before the millennium in terms of their trade balance and an unsure recovery vis-à-vis the
global market post-2008. Seen below in a three-dimensional graph (with distinct color coding) is
each group’s import and export behavior. There exists a broad gap between autocracies with
weak networks’ export and import levels, in favor of imports. For a very brief moment in time,
around 2006, the divide was bridged, only to plunge out of equilibrium again. In contrast with the
two groups with Global Compact presence, who are able to keep a consistent modicum of
balance in their trade relationships, autocracies with weak networks have been thus far unable
to solve their deficit problem, with exports nose-diving around 2011. However, in spite of the
related budget issues, these countries are undeniably very globalized. Taking full advantage of
the resurgent market after 2008 have been democracies with weak networks. Again (and
expectedly) showing itself to be the most economically open group, democracies that have
avoided the Global Compact appear to have relatively export-led economies, accounting for well
clear of 60% of GDP by the end of the data timeframe and marking a rise of around 25% from
export levels in 1990. These countries have also frequently shown a willingness to suffer a
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deficit in their trade relationships, but seem to have emerged from 2008 with strong positive
trends in favor of their export-based businesses.
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iii) Merchandise Trade, as % of GDP
The merchandise trade category was chosen as a means to paint a more detailed
picture of the economic make-up of the groups, or, of the environment in which the GC
operates. Most significant about these results is, again, the nature of the environments in which
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the GC does not operate. Very clearly leading the merchandise trade category, once again, are
democracies with weak global compact networks, whose annual trade in merchandise roughly
equals their entire GDP. The other three groups cluster together at between 50%-60% GDP
equivalent to merchandise trade.

iv) Services Trade, as % of GDP
Showing greater diversity between groups than merchandise trade, trade in services still
continues to exemplify democracies with weak GC networks as the most open trading group.
The data is weaker than that for other sets, limited to the period 2005-2013, but manages to
demonstrate certain tendencies in the groups nonetheless. Both sets of autocracies have
gradually decreased the relevance of services trade to their economies since 2005. While
democracies with strong networks have increased since the beginning of the dataset, the uptick
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has been modest. Democracies with weak networks have increased their trade of this nature in
an almost mirror opposite fashion to the trend shown by autocracies with weak networks.
Services trade has shown itself to be much less volatile than the more tangible merchandise
kind, producing level trends and gradual increases and decreases. The amounts accounted for
are also noticeably smaller.
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What the Data Means
For the hypothesis to have stood up to the math, clear increases in globalization
“behavior” across the two temporal categories would have to have been observable in the
graphs for democracies with GC presence between 2000 and 2013. The static measure (the
policy dimension) would have had to demonstrate a corresponding preference for low tariffs and
ease of starting a foreign business in democracies with strong networks. Also necessary for a
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validation of the hypothesis would have been relatively negligible moves toward liberalization on
the part of the democracies with weak networks, and increasing skepticism (demonstrated by
closing borders to trade and investment) on the part of autocracies with strong networks. The
autocracies with weak networks category could have likewise moved against the grain of its
autocratic competitor. This has clearly not been the case for the trade or policy dimensions.
With no wish to stumble in self-delusion through the unwelcoming streets of mathematical
contradiction, it must be conceded that something very different is happening. Despite the lack
of support for two thirds of the hypothesis, strong and meaningful assertions can be made from
the data about the role of the Global Compact in the world. Also, in contrast particularly to the
trade dimension, investors seem to be using a different set of calculations that may provide
support for the hypothesis.
The goal of establishing a clear causal relationship between the Global Compact and
economic liberalization was always distant in light of an enormous range of spurious factors.
However, in light of the data and by a slight shift in the orientation of analysis, the original
hypothesis will be recalibrated to examine the contexts in which the GC operates. Just as
important to the business case for (or against) the GC will be an examination of the contexts in
which the GC does not operate. In the case of the trade dimension this latter consideration
happens to be the most fertile ground for drawing conclusions. Through this lens, the above
stated research question, “How has the Global Compact affected economic policy in countries
with strong GC local networks?” becomes “What sort of economic environments are
encouraging/discouraging of strong GC local networks?” From the narrow confines of trying to
establish that A causes B, this discussion will henceforth turn to pragmatic, topographical
analysis of both the trade and policy dimensions. A return to the original frame of analysis will
be allowed, for the sake of speculation, on the investment dimension. This should be prefaced
with a cautionary note that investors, like manufacturers, service providers and policy makers,
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factor many things into a consideration of where and how to invest, and it is not the intention of
the author to run wild with conclusions.

The most glaring empirical departure from the hypothesis, and the most compelling
data, is provided by the trading phenomena observed in democracies with weak networks.
These countries show remarkably higher levels of globalization across this dimension, being
economically reliant on their external commercial relationships to a considerable degree. At
the same time, the respective business communities in this most extroverted of trading
cliques apparently show no interest in the world’s largest corporate responsibility initiative. It
is the contention of this author that actors in a highly extroverted economy will be less likely
to sign up to corporate responsibility regimes to seek advantage in the international
marketplace by their relative freedom from ideological positions. Put simply, those who rely
heavily on their international relationships for economic survival are prone to be business
conservatives, and therefore conduct “business as usual”. There is a certain pessimistic
intuitiveness to this line of thought. If Papa New Guinea’s main trading partner were China,
PNG might be sensitive to the risk of being perceived by its largest export market as
pushing an ideology of labor rights in a country that is famously critical of unionization. This
in turn begs the question “why does China allow the Global Compact to operate within its
borders?”. Regardless of China’s business environment, the assumption from PNG is that
value-free trading will prove more secure in the long term. The extroverted business
community may also find more opportunities in conjunction with a less restrained playbook.
The decision not to sign up for a corporate responsibility initiative, it must be stressed, does
not necessarily denote an immoral business culture, or one that seeks any advantage no
matter how predatory the means. There is simply a wish to operate off the ESG radar.
There are problems with this position, as one would expect. A challenge for the
following discussion is the requirement of parsimony, to refer to presumably diverse and
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vibrant domestic business cultures as monolithic entities, as well as groups of business
cultures, a dozen or more strong, in the same vain. The same problem will be encountered
with investors and policy makers. Specific to issues with the above stated explanation for
the trade data, the dominance of European Union-acceded nations in the democracies with
weak GC membership category may present a challenge. The purpose of joining (and
indeed, creating) the common market in Europe was always one of economic incentive.
Relatively more trading can be expected from members of a free trade zone that also
happens to be the world’s largest single market. Does this account for the variation from the
other democratic category? Some authors in the field have commented on the reasons for
the GC’s delayed adoption in the United States. The consensus has been that the States’
litigious culture made many potential signatories wary of the thought of an annual
communication on progress (Kell, 2013,). Could some set of shared cultural considerations
beyond an emphasis on trade be shaping these countries’ decisions not to adopt UN-style
corporate responsibility? Is there something specific in the products being exported by
these countries that don’t necessitate ESG reform? Finally, the data shows conflicting
outcomes between democracies and autocracies with GC presence- as predicted by the
hypothesis- but its inverse. Autocracies with GC networks are seen to be more open on the
trade dimension than their political brethren, while democracies with GC networks are less
open. Why should this be the case?
The most fundamental critique of the above theory however, before any of the finer
points can be examined, is this: are these democracies simply less enthusiastic about ESG
issues? This would go a long way toward explaining their abstention from the Global
Compact, and while we generally think of democracies as progressive and in favor of these
sorts of values, it is good to test our assumptions every once in a while. Good science has
foundered on broadly accepted pretexts that have later proven problematic, and more than
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once. To address this possibility, the United Nations’ Human Rights Council Universal
Periodic Reviews (most recent data ranging from 2008 to 2013 for all member states) of the
twelve democracies with weak GC networks have been examined and briefly summarized
in the following few paragraphs.
New Zealand and Ireland are each lauded for their strong traditions of protecting and
promoting human rights. New Zealand was the first nation in the world to give women the
right to vote. Its indigenous population, the Maori, and settling historic claims provide the
island nation with its largest human rights challenges, which it appears to be facing up to in
fine style. The broad scope of international obligations, and history of support for
international conventions and declarations, as well as the successful national
implementation of international treaties, all indicate a firm champion of human rights. Ireland
similarly has a legislative review process that ensures all laws passed by parliament are in
accordance with international human rights obligations. It has gone as far as to establish
distinct and independent human rights institutions in government, the Irish Human Rights
Commission, the Equality Authority and the Equality Tribunal, among others, to ensure a
pluralistic and open society. Most significantly for the argument under consideration, both
countries have acceded to a broad spectrum of international human rights treaties and
covenants… but not the Global Compact.
The Eastern European bloc of this group have largely followed the provisos in the
UN Paris Principles and established autonomous human rights agencies within their own
governments charged with raising awareness and promoting the observation of human
rights. In some cases, such as Latvia, international law precedents on human rights have
been adopted by the domestic legal systems. All have acceded to the major UN human
rights instruments, as well as those of the International Labor Organization. Most have also
issued standing invitations to the special UN human rights procedures- a type of human
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rights “merit badge” in the UN system. Most have also adopted human rights into their core
education curricula. The human rights issues faced by these countries, such as secret CIA
extraditions in the Czech Republic or human trafficking Slovakia, are usually human rights
challenges imposed on the nation from without. The shared domestic issue faced by the
East Europe bloc is discrimination, often on the grounds of sexual orientation. The countries
have uniformly taken steps to strengthen anti-discrimination legislation when it has arisen.
The weakest performer in the bloc on ESG issues is Romania, with recurrent concerns
regarding high level and local corruption, mistreatment of detainees in its penal facilities and
discrimination (HRC, 2008-2014).
Botswana has acceded to all major human rights treaties and conventions. It
protects minority rights within its borders, ensures access to justice, freedom of the press,
and has mainstreamed human rights training for its police force. It is also tolerant of trade
unions. All told, Botswana is a model for successful human rights implementation in Africa.
A telling demonstration of the government’s resolve in this area has been to initiate
programs that train “traditional leaders” (tribal elders etc.) in international, human rightsoriented distribution of justice. Some tension exists between the culture in Botswana and
UN norms, for instance Botswana’s retention of the death penalty and corporal punishment
in schools. These are by no means indicative of a national mentality suspicious of the UN
human rights regime. Botswana has shown broad and resolute support of social
responsibility norms (HRC, 2008).
The most problematic for the group, therefore potentially providing an ideological
explanation for abstention from GC networks, are Sri Lanka and Papua New Guinea. The
former had the misfortune of being embroiled in a bloody and drawn out civil conflict until
2009, which tends to stain national human rights records. It would be unfair to assume that
the government of Sri Lanka was thus brushing away all international pressure to improve
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its record at a difficult time: during its Universal Periodic Review, in 2012, Sri Lanka was
working on implementing no less than 71 UN recommendations for the protection of rights.
Of the group, Papua New Guinea is the most reticent when it comes to dealing
substantively with the international community. It experiences widespread discrimination
against women, increasingly frequent sorcery killings, domestic abuse and a lack of
freedom of information, but takes fewer steps and involves fewer international instruments
than its counterparts to effectively tackle these problems. The important point to consider for
the democracies with weak networks group is not necessarily the human rights situation in
country per se, but rather the way each nation interfaces with the international community to
address ESG issues. With the possible exception of Papua New Guinea, the group is
shown to be highly cooperative and treaty-prone. The likelihood of GC abstention relating to
ideological qualms is very limited.
Six states from the European Union are represented in the Democracies without GC
Networks category: the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Estonia, Latvia, Ireland and Romania, a
full half of the dataset, and certainly enough to influence the results should the EU’s effect
on trade be strong enough. Each of these nations has enormous incentives to adopt a
trade-oriented approach to economic stewardship. If the extroversion observed in the group
were in fact par for the course for the EU, it would have to be conceded that the Global
Compact was not part of the equation. Or rather, that there is nothing remarkable about the
group’s shunning of the GC, and its propensity toward hyper-globalization was simply a
feature of the EU and its low barriers. This is not the case. At year 1 for the data (1990), the
European Union average percentage of GDP accounted for by its exports was twenty-five,
and by 2013 that figure reached forty two percent. Likewise for imports, the twenty-three
years under review saw an increase from twenty six to thirty nine percent. When compared
to the four groups, the EU average is slightly higher on both trade metrics than both
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autocratic groups and democracies with strong networks, but significantly lower than the
democracies with weak networks group. By 2013, the group in question chalked up an
additional twenty percent of its GDP from trade compared to the European Union. In relative
terms, these six nations are considerably more open to and reliant upon trade than their
European neighbors.
In terms of litigation, or other idiosyncratic domestic concerns within these
democracies that may prompt a cautious approach to the GC on the part of respective
business communities, sheer complexity makes it difficult to render indicators. Much of what
is said about the maligned “litigious society” centers around introspective outrage within the
United States at a society encouraged to get something for nothing through the filing of
frivolous lawsuits. The McDonalds coffee-spilling incident has become both “Munich” and
“Saigon” to this particular debate. However, the focus has only recently expanded to include
nations outside of the US, and apparently only for comparative purposes. Even this cautious
peek outside of America’s borders has thus far included only a few west European
countries. As a result, no comprehensive system is in place to rank countries by their
frequency or per capita incidence of lawsuits filed against businesses or people, and much
is left to speculation and opinion. A poor substitute, perhaps, but Oded Shenkar and
Yadong Luo in their textbook on international business use a ranking of “fair administration
of justice” to exemplify the international environment of litigation. Only two of the
democracies with weak networks (Ireland and New Zealand) make it into the top twenty-five
on this ranking (Shenkar & Luo, p200). No country from either autocratic group made the
top twenty-five (while over half from the democracies with strong networks were
represented). Other literature on the subject corroborates the story: Ireland and New
Zealand are referenced in the same breath as the United States in terms of their propensity
to litigate (Edwards, p.446).
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Looking to the rest of Europe, some illumination of the legal environments in the six
countries in question is offered by the European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice
(CEPEJ), a review and advisory body. In terms of the public budget allocated to courts (per
capita) for purposes other than legal aid and criminal prosecution, the Czech Republic
spends the most (€35) of the six, and Romania the least (€15), but not one of the “weak
network six” tops the European Union average of thirty-nine euros. Likewise, in terms of the
number of incoming non-criminal cases per one hundred inhabitants, only Estonia, with
twenty, beats the European Union average of fourteen cases (CEPEJ, p46, 82). The rest of
the group is considerably below average on this litigation metric, too. At least for the half of
the democracies with weak networks group comprised of EU member states, the challenge
that their non-adoption of the Global Compact is due to domestic legal concerns, rather than
extroversion, does not stand under scrutiny. With the possible exception of Ireland,
evidence points to these being among Europe’s least litigious societies.
Very little can be found alluding to the emergence of lawyer-happy cultures in
Botswana, Papua New Guinea or Tunisia. In Taiwan, there are rumblings of a change in
direction from the nation’s traditionally inquisitorial legal system towards the American
model of adversarial, attorney-centric proceedings. This system is sometimes criticized as a
systemic cause of lawsuit proliferation, a phenomena some are beginning to point to in
Taipei (Copper, p. 253). Another group member with an adversarial court system, Sri
Lanka, has been criticized (though by dubious sources) for its frequent recourse to lawsuits
after the 2004 tsunami. Use of the country’s “Fundamental Rights” law is also common in
disputes between minorities and the government. However, there is scant evidence to
suggest that a business-threatening legal culture exists.
Another indicator, one that does not specifically demonstrate the domestic legal
environment but certainly implies it, is the World Bank’s “ease of doing business” ranking.
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Estonia, Latvia, Ireland and New Zealand are all found in World Bank’s top twenty-five
business friendly countries, while the rest of the group are scattered somewhere around
fiftieth place (World Bank, 2014), with the exception of Taiwan. Thanks to China’s influence
in World Bank, the global financial institution does not report on Taiwan as a sovereign
entity. For a consideration of the island state as an autonomous nation, an equivalent
annual ranking on Forbes places Taiwan in the top twenty countries for doing business
(Forbes, 2014). In contradiction of the “litigious societies” explanation, this group of
democracies seems to be on average slightly more business friendly and, on the whole,
less litigious than neighbors of the respective group members (consider Australia, England,
Germany or India, all of whom exhibit muscular legal cultures).
Could it be the case that the group in question has a comparative advantage in a
rudimentary area of production that, through universal demand or meeting demand in the
underdeveloped world (which may have less expectations when it comes to human rights
and anti-corruption efforts- or may have expectations to the contrary of GC principles) does
not associate as naturally with ESG issues? This seems unlikely. Two of the above datasets
were collected to obviate such a possibility by giving a more detailed picture of the nature of
each group’s trade. If merchandise trade had far outstripped services trade for the
democracies with weak networks group, the notion would bear more interrogation, but
instead a clear lead is demonstrated in both types of trade. These are diverse, modern
economies. On closer inspection of the trade profiles of each country it is revealed that the
primary trading partners of each are relatively unlikely to be autocratic. Only 50% of the
group have an autocracy in their top three trading partners, and most often these are big
market autocracies like Russia and China that have strong GC networks (WTO, 2014).
Finally, are the calculations that lead to avoidance or adoption of the Global
Compact by the domestic business communities in democracies the same as those made in
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autocracies? Across the trade dimension it cannot be ignored that, regardless of political
system, those without GC networks tend to be more globalized. While autocracies without
GC networks tend to be African, Middle Eastern or Central Asian, often with dubious human
rights records and famously corrupt governments, it would be presumptive to assume that
their respective private sectors (beholden to government, as many of them are) share some
mass antipathy to human rights (though a case might be made for mass antipathy to labor
rights). It seems reasonable to make room for skepticism in much of the former colonial
world when confronted with foreign (western) institutions and initiatives. The colonial past
may well factor into the decision-making processes in autocracies, where it was largely
absent in the democratic group.
The rationale employed by the autocracies with weak networks group is likely to be
similar but more complex than the proposed rationality of the democratic group (that strong
reliance on external trade may breed a conservative approach to modern corporate
responsibility). The relative freedom from government intervention of a democratic business
community demonstrates a sanctified separation of public and private in many democracies.
Moreover, the trend over the course of recent history has been toward privatization, not
nationalization, in most (though not all) countries with legitimate elections. The converse is
true in most autocracies, where business is often either a direct function of government,
subject to clientelism, or at the very least engaged in the reciprocal appropriation of favors
in the form of protectionism, kickbacks, government contracts or access to foreign aid. To
sign onto a corporate responsibility initiative that encourages businesses to cultivate a
climate of anti-corruption norms, and furthermore requires a report on progress each year,
makes little strategic sense in an environment like this. All of which begs the question, why
do any companies in autocratic regimes sign up for the Global Compact? The answer may
be laid bare in the investment analysis.
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The investment data tells a very different story. Leaving aside for a moment the
autocracies with strong networks’ apparent success in attracting large amounts of foreign
investment, the trade dimension’s unrivaled front runners are relegated to much more
mortal performance through the prism of FDI. Democracies with weak networks seem to
have attracted barely more revenue than the autocracies that also shun the GC. The
problem comes from trying to gauge how much, if any, of the diversity in capital inflows can
be attributed to a business environment that espouses human rights norms. While a strong
culture of human rights may suggest to investors that their money is going to a more
responsible recipient in conditions governed by the rule of law, the peace of mind that this
provokes may be offset by the inclusion of labor rights, which suggest to many business
conservatives the prospect of meddlesome, inefficient unions. Add to this plurality of
ideological strains within the GC’s moral architecture an inclination for cash to flow naturally
toward bigger economies (which are not necessarily democratic, or concerned with people’s
rights), and the data looks more suggestive than conclusive. Fortunately, there are
increasingly tall shoulders for the data to stand on, and a swelling bulk of work that props up
the assertion that human rights and good governance are positively correlated with
investment.
Under FDI, although both groups with GC networks lead the pack, controlling for the
two largest economies (Russia and China) has the effect of practically tying the autocracies
with strong networks with the autocracies with weak networks group. This effect is seen
again (without the need to control for Russia and China) in the FPI data. Investors show a
clear preference for democracies when they know their money is going to be engaged over
the long term. Despite the apparent volatility of this kind of investment, there seems to have
been little to no interest in portfolio investment in autocracies with weak networks at any
time.
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The traditional narrative on the relationship between investment and human rights is
one of inherent tension (Blanton & Blanton, 2007). Broadly speaking, conventional wisdom
has held that coercive political environments make for more attractive investment climates
due to the host government’s ability to suppress protest, hold down labor costs and supply
favors. Nowhere is this more forcefully laid out than in the neo-Marxist critiques of the ‘60s
and ‘70s, which focus on systemic pressures to maintain growth and profitability and the
rationality of moving production abroad as domestic conditions become less favorable. As
labor use shifts from core to periphery, a population that can be exploited and controlled by
its own elites makes the most sense to employ, thus a perpetual situation of dependency
arises. The world’s poorest populations are therefore of essential value to advanced
capitalist firms, but only in a subordinated, oppressed condition. The dictatorial regimes
governing them solicit capital by peddling a repressive political situation of their own making
on the international market as an asset of inestimable worth. Key to an understanding of
this view is the reciprocal nature of the relationship between repressive governments and
foreign capital (Blanton & Blanton, 2007).
Increasingly, empirical support for this point of view is slipping away. Three important
developments have shifted the rules of the game and made modern investors more prone
to do business with human rights respecting governments. First, the emergence of
a “spotlight regime”, a desirable by-product of the information age, has had the effect of
naming and shaming numerous corporations who could previously have turned a blind eye
to human rights abuse (or even abetted it) with impunity. Corporations have become
sensitive to any public association between their brand image and abusive behavior, and
along with that sensitivity, awareness that today’s lightning fast pace of communication
necessitates firms’ staying in front of issues before they make the news. As in Myanmar in
2000, accusations of labor abuse from the United States led to immediate and precipitous
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outflows of FDI (Blanton & Blanton, 2007). Second, there has been a broad decrease in the
share of investment costs attributed to labor. Between 1970 and 1990, on average, the
portion of production costs comprised of labor dropped to less than half its original figure.
This phenomenon implies a mitigation of the pressures to keep labor costs as low as
possible, as they cease to be a primary expenditure. Of course minimizing expenditure will
still be desirable, but lower costs mean more room for decision-makers to factor in other
concerns (for instance, the spotlight regime). Third, the increasing diversification of FDI has
taken much of the global share of investment away from primary commodity exports such
as petroleum. There is mounting empirical evidence that companies now prioritize quality of
labor over low cost, an observation logically supported by the development of efficiencydriven technology. For a skilled labor pool, education and opportunities are necessary.
These suggest, without necessitating, a respect for human rights. In sum, the paradigm of
profitability coming at the expense of local populations looks outdated (Blanton & Blanton,
2007).
One study from the University of Memphis (Blanton & Blanton, 2007) used statistical
regression and control measures for relative economic size to demonstrate an increase of
4% of GDP accounted for by FDI between abusive regimes and those that respect human
rights. The positive, indirect effects of investment in terms of human capital also served to
shore up and solidify human rights norms, generating a virtuous cycle between investment
and respect for populations. Put another way, “developing countries that respect human
rights are more successful in attracting foreign direct investment than those characterized
by… abusive practices” (Blanton & Blanton, 2007). Some autocracies, notably those in the
autocracies with strong networks group, seem to have taken this message on board.
Whether they do so nominally, in a cynical bid for investment capital, or through genuine
openness to different modes of operation, is rather an important question. In the end, the
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efficacy of the Global Compact at bringing about its stated goals, compliance with the ten
principles, will determine its impact. This is beyond the purview of the research question
addressed here, but it seems reasonable to say that positively influencing the conditions “on
the ground” in this group will be the GC’s greatest challenge. The above data provides
further support for the emergent narrative that positively correlates human rights and ESG
responsibility with FDI. Interestingly, considerations for FPI seem to be made more along
the lines of strict preference for democratic institutions. Political stability and the stronger
tradition of rule of law associated with democracy appear to be of primary concern for long
term investments. Still, between the autocratic groups a significantly larger chunk of this
type of investment was made for all twenty-three years in the autocracies that had adopted
the GC.
Across the policy dimension, presence of GC networks tends to correlate with
stronger protectionism, therefore relatively more closed economies. In terms of both
average applied tariffs and ease of starting a foreign business, democracies without GC
networks are once again the front-runners (though practically tied with the other democratic
group on the latter metric). Autocracies with strong networks are the most protectionist of
the four by a significant amount. In the autocratic context, GC presence may be understood
as the intrepid modernism of a cosseted and evidently well financed business culture. With
the zealous protection of government trade barriers working in their favor, the respective
private sectors operate in a risk-reduced environment and adopt cutting edge business
ideology to attract investment. Another possible explanation, particularly for the difficulty of
starting a foreign business on these shores, squares with the original hypothesis: that these
autocratic regimes maintained their protectionist stances partially in response to the
influence of foreign ideas and norms encroaching on their economic operations. A certain
degree of contradiction remains in the most economically sheltered group participating in
47

GC local networks. This reflects the natural tension that exists in autocratic regimes, most
with notorious human rights records, widespread anecdotal evidence of corruption, and
frequent opposition to labor rights, hosting GC networks in the first place. Another possible
explanation is that this tension in fact reflects an ideological disparity between business
communities and government. Where business communities and government are
operationally tough to separate, it may reflect a fracturing in the government itself. This
would tally with modernization theory’s prediction that democratic institutions follow in the
wake of economic progress. Without much further evidence, however, this seems a very
optimistic (not to mention ethnocentric) conclusion to draw.
A more parsimonious and cogent narrative can be drawn from the democracies with
weak networks policy data. In keeping with the data on trade, these economies are starting
to look robustly extroverted from the top down. A complementary relationship appears to
exist between government and the private sector, not of the crony sort, but rather of a
shared economic vision. These states, previously conceptualized as extroverted business
conservatives, appear with the addition of the policy metric to be carrying the torch for
traditional laissez-faire capitalism. Compared to their peers they are open, globally-oriented,
energetic traders, and not concerned with corporate responsibility initiatives.
Conclusion
While investors show a preference for climates that demonstrably adopt ESG norms
and corresponding initiatives, business environments that are highly dependent on trade
tend to remain conservative in their attitudes toward globalized corporate responsibility.
What are the implications of this research in regard to the business case for the Global
Compact? In one sense, the research makes a strong and practical case for the benefits of
GC membership, appealing not to utopian, pie-in-the-sky idealism, but instead to people’s
pocketbooks. Investors are attracted to socially responsible business climates, and the data
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suggests that Global Compact membership sends a strong, positive message to potential
recipients. Levels of Foreign Direct and Portfolio investment are clearly higher in countries
that host strong GC networks. The research also provides a telling caveat to the GC rallying
cry, that corporate responsibility has “gone global” and contemporary business sees a
proactive stance on ESG issues as inherently in its favor. When the stakes are high in
international trade, that is, when an economy becomes highly dependent on its trade
competitiveness, initiatives that constrain (via transparency and aspirational demands) the
traditional operation of business are less likely to be adopted. Highly extroverted economies
are more prone to an old fashioned, tried-and-true conservative business orientation that
has not as yet seen merit in global corporate responsibility initiatives. This effect is seen in
the democracies with weak GC networks group and its hyperactive global trading.
The pressures of the information age “spotlight”, as well as incentives from investors
and the changing requirements of production are likely to bring these holdout democracies
into the fold in the not-too-distant future. The laissez-faire approach to capitalism will likely
continue to hold a certain appeal, but events like the 2008 financial crisis make it politically
less feasible to apply. As for the autocracies with weak networks, arguably the control group
for this research, it is tough to say what pressures can be brought to bear to improve
governance in these countries. Given the symbiotic relationship that many authors have
observed between oppressive regimes and foreign business interests, a shift on the part of
the global business community away from egregious practices of old may help kick away a
long-time crutch from rights abusing autocrats, as the limitation of bilateral aid has done.
There are many ways for the Global Compact to bring about real change, but it must
continue to convincingly portray itself as being beneficial to business. While acting in an
ethical manner is undoubtedly the preference for most, if not all businesses, arguments that
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invoke a positive outcome for the pocketbooks of CEOs and board members can be
counted on to resonate most strongly.
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